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TO KILL (OR IMPRISON FOR LIFE) A JUVENILE: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. V UNDER SEAL REGARDING THE
PROPER USE AND EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
FOR SENTENCING A JUVENILE OFFENDER
ANDRE M. BOARD

I.

INTRODUCTION

The killing of a mockingbird, in the Pulitzer Prize winning novel To Kill
a Mockingbird, was emblematical of the destruction of innocence. The
songbird, in the literary piece, embodied a purity that brought harm to no
one and should not be killed.' A child or adolescent reflects that same innocence and that wholesomeness invokes an earnest protection from harm.
However, what if that mockingbird or adolescent harms another? Does the
law seek to shelter the now "juvenile" from the retributive hand of justice?
U.S. v. Under Seal 2 engages this matter from the purview of the legislative
intent and constitutional jurisprudence.
The severability of unconstitutional provisions within statutes to punish
the criminal acts of juveniles was an issue of first impression for the Court.3
Previous Supreme Court decisions have only prohibited juveniles from being sentenced to death4 and mandatory life without parole. In this matter,
the Government sought to prosecute a juvenile for murder in aid of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (a)(1), by severing or excising the statute to
permit punishment under an inapplicable crime. 6 The appellate court held
* J.D./MBA candidate, North Carolina Central University, 2017; B.A., Morehouse College, Philosophy, 2009. I dedicate this case note to my grandmother and best friend, Barbara Reagor. She devoted her time, energy, resources, and inexhaustible love to ensure I was afforded every opportunity for
advancement. She always tells me, "Remember who you are and whose you are," and that message
continues to guide my decisions and future endeavors. God has blessed my life and this case note is a
reflection of her contributions to my accomplishments.
1. NELLE H. LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 128 (1960).

2:
3.
4.
5.
6.

United States v. Under Seal, 819 F.3d 715 (4th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 721.
Id. at 719.
Id.
Id. at 720.
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that it is impermissible to use excision to combine the penalty provisions
for two distinct criminal acts.7 In sum, the Court found the Government's
proposal to be an impermissible judicial rewriting of the statute's murder
penalty provision. Courts are provided the discretion to interpret legislative
intent when determining the applicability of the law to a set of facts, but it
cannot rule in a manner that would alter the overall purpose or punishment
set forth by the statute.9
The following case note will discuss the effect the Under Seal decision
will have on subsequent cases involving criminal acts charged against a
juvenile. Secondly, the note will discuss how the decision in Under Seal
limits the potential abuse of the principle of severability to prosecute crimes
generally. Finally, the note will briefly discuss the implications retroactivity
will have on previous convictions.
II.

THE CASE

In this matter, the Government is seeking an appeal from a denied motion
to transfer the juvenile defendant for prosecution as an adult.o Defendant
was a few months shy of his eighteenth birthday; Defendant allegedly participated in a gang related murder." The Government sought to prosecute
Defendant for murder in aid of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1959
(a)( 1).12 This statute provides that whomever, while engaged in a racketeering activity (organized crime), murders another individual will be punished
by death or life imprisonment; and for kidnapping, by imprisonment for any
term of years or life.13 The Government filed a delinquency information and
certification against Defendant and simultaneously moved to transfer him
for prosecution as an adult for murder in aid of racketeering. 14 The district
court concluded that although factors were present to support the transfer,
granting the motion would be unconstitutional.1 5 The court explained that it
did not have the discretion to sentence a defendant to less than the statutory
16
mandatory minimum life sentence for a violation of §1959(a) for murder.
Court precedent held imposing a mandatory life sentence on a juvenile, like

&

7. Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 724.
8. Id.
9. See id. ("The penalty enacted for the kidnapping-based offense cannot simply be interchanged
with and applied to the murder-based offense, as these are two wholly separate means of violating
1959 with distinct elements.").
10. Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 717.
11. Id. at 718.
12. Id.
13. Id at 720.
14. Id at 718.
15. Id
16. Id
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the Defendant, to be constitutionally prohibited.17 Lastly, the district court
rejected the Government's argument that §1959(a)(1) could be excised to
permit a sentence of a term of years for a juvenile offender.18 The court
reasoned that it had no authority under §1959(a)(1) to impose a sentence
other than the mandatory minimum provided by the statute required for
murder.19

The appellate court did not only review the district court's statutory and
constitutional rulings related to the decision to deny the motion to transfer,
but also whether the denial was an abuse of discretion.2 0 On appeal, the
Government contended that the impermissible punishments can be excised
from §1959(a)(1), leaving intact language for the separate criminal act of
kidnapping in aid of racketeering, which would authorize a term of years up
to a discretionary maximum sentence of life. 2 1 The appellate court held the
Government's proposal contravened the principals governing both severance and due process.2 2 Furthermore, the Government's proposed act treads
into the legislative role of articulating the authorized penalties for criminal
conduct. 23 The appellate court reasoned that Defendant cannot be prosecuted for murder in aid of racketeering because his conviction would require
the court to impose an unconstitutional sentence against a juvenile.24 The
appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court did not err in denying the Government's motion to transfer Defendant for prosecution as an adult. 25 In sum, the court found the Government's proposal was an impermissible judicial rewriting of the statute's
murder penalty provision. 2 6
III.

BACKGROUND

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act2 7 ("Act") provides
a foundation for the legal discussion within this case. The act states that a
"juvenile" is a person who has not reached the age of eighteen. 28 The act
permits a juvenile, 15 years of age or older, to be transferred to adult status
for prosecution if they are alleged to have committed certain violent crimes,
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 718-19.
Id at 719.
Id
Id at 720-21.
Id at 721.
Id at 723.
Id
Id at 728.
Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 728.
Id at 724.
18 U.S.C. § 5031 (2016).
Id. at§ 5031.
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such as murder 2 9 . The district court has the authority to grant the transfer if,
after a hearing, there is a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would be in the interest of justice. 30 The court must consider the defendant's age, social background, the nature of the alleged offense, and the juvenile's prior delinquency record. 3 1 However, satisfying these elements
does not ensure the transfer, prosecution, or sentencing of a juvenile. The
Supreme Court's interpretation of the U.S. Constitution has provided guidance regarding the constitutionality of sentencing juveniles.32
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Unites States Constitution have been interpreted by the Supreme Court to prohibit sentencing a
juvenile to the death penalty.3 3 The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment and applies to the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 4 In Roper v, Simmons, the Court
interpreted how the death penalty would be a disproportionate, cruel and
unusual punishment if applied to a juvenile. 35 The death penalty's purpose
is to promote retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective
offenders. 3 6 The Court in Roper explained the evolution of its prior decisions regarding the execution of a juvenile offender and how such a punishment would "offend civilized standards of decency." 37 The Court stated
that the last execution of a juvenile offender under the age of 16 was performed in 1948 to demonstrate the rarity and the antiquated nature of the
practice. 38 Furthermore, the Court opined, "[t]he reasons why juveniles are
not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain
why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an
adult." 39 The Court reasoned that "a lack of maturity" and an "underdeveloped sense of responsibility found in youth more often than in adults" are
acceptable rationales for a juvenile's criminal behavior. 4 0 Furthermore, the
Court reasoned that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to peer
pressure 4 1, have less experience and control over their own environment,42
29. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2016).
30. Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 718.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 719 (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 723 (2016)).
33. Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 719 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
34. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
35. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958)).
36. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
37. Id. at 561 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)).
38. Id. at 561 (citing Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832-833).
39. Id. at 561 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835).
40. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 359-362 (1993)).
41. Id. at 568 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982).
42. Id at 568; see Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014
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and their character is not as well formed compared to an adult.43 The Court
concluded that these characteristics compared to an adult offender substantiated an Eighth Amendment prohibition of the death penalty on a juvenile
under the age of 18.
The Court also held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited juvenile offenders who commit murder from being sentenced to mandatory life without parole.45 Miller v. Alabama examined how a mandatory life sentencing
scheme for a juvenile is considered "cruel and unusual punishment" under
the Eighth Amendment. In this case, a 14-year-old was charged with capital
felony murder in the course of arson.46 The lower court granted removal of
the defendant from juvenile status to being sentenced as an adult.4 7 The
charged crime carried a mandatory minimum punishment of life without
parole.48 The lower court held that life without parole was "not overly harsh
when compared to the crime" and the mandatory nature of the sentencing
scheme was permissible under the Eighth Amendment.49
The Court decided in Graham v. Floridathat life without parole violates
the Eighth Amendment when imposed on juvenile non-homicide offenders. 50 The Court in Miller examined the precedent established regarding
categorical bans on sentencing practices based on the culpability of the juvenile and the severity of the penalty." The Court has established in Roper
and in Graham that children are constitutionally different from adults for
the purposes of sentencing.52 Juveniles are deemed by the Court to have a
diminished culpability and greater prospects for reformation, making them
"less deserving of the most severe punishments." 53 However, Miller did
limit this theory by asserting that a juvenile offender whose crimes reflect
irreparable corruption may be sentenced to life without parole.54 The Court
in Miller further extended the rationale provided in Graham to forbid a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole
for juvenile offenders. It was held that such a scheme poses a great risk of
(2003) ("As legal minors, [juveniles] lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a
criminogenic setting.").
43. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; see generally E. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968).
44. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
45. Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 718 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012)).
46. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
47. Id. at 2462.
48. Id at 2463.
49. Id
50. Id (citing Graham v. Florida 560 U.S. 48 (2010)).
51. Id at 2463 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 61).
52. Id at 2464.
53. Id.
54. Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 719.
55. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
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disproportionate punishment when youth and its embodied characteristics
are disregarded.5 6
The Court in Montgomery v. Louisianagave the Miller holding a retroactive effect.17 A retroactive effect would permit juvenile offenders sentenced,
before the Miller decision, to life imprisonment without parole an opportunity to be reheard under a collateral review (an attack on the judgment).58
The Court reasoned that the retroactive effect does not require a
"relitigation" of sentences or convictions in every case where a juvenile
offender received mandatory life without parole.5 9 The Government would
have to find a remedy that would not force a juvenile whose crimes reflect
only transient immaturity, and who have since matured, to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.60
In Under Seal, the Government argued to sever or excise the unconstitutional portions of the statute in question, so the remaining portions may be
applied.6 1 When a court determines that a statute contains unconstitutional
provisions, it has the authority to "try to limit the solution to the problem"
by considering the possibility of "sever[ing] its problematic portions while
leaving the remainder intact." 62 The purpose of the principle of severance is
to eliminate unconstitutional provisions of the current statute without completely invalidating the entire statute.6 3 The Supreme Court articulated,
"[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would have not enacted those
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not,
the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." 64
The objective is to ensure that the severance of the statute does not impact
the congressional intent and remains "fully operative as law." 65 However, if
the "balance of the legislation is incapable of functioning independently,"
then severance is not permissible.66 Furthermore, a void in the statutory
language cannot be filled by looking to other offenses.67

56. Id.
57. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. Id.
61. Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 719.
62. Id at 721 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328-29
(2006)).
63. Id, see also Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 438 (4th
Cir. 2007).
64. Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 722 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684
(1987)).
65. Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 722 (quoting Brock, 480 U.S. at 684).
66. Id. (quoting Brock, 480 U.S. at 685).
67. Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 725.
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The Government in Under Seal proposes a penalty provision that would
differ from the intent of the Legislature which would counter the Constitution's guarantee of due process. A person must receive fair notice of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment and the severity of the penalty
the government may impose.68 The right to a fair warning may be unlawfully omitted by an "unforeseeable and retroactive" judicial severability analysis resulting from the excision of one penalty provision for the application
of another.6 9
Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery cohesively reflect the evolution
of criminal juvenile sentencing. A juvenile cannot be sentenced to death or
a life sentence without parole because it would violate the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution as "cruel and unusual punishment."7 0 The principle
of severability was a matter of first impression for the court in Under
Seal. 7 1 The decision provides another consideration that needs to be made
when sentencing a juvenile offender for a heinous crime.
The appellate court in this matter appropriately followed the Court's legislative history of juvenile sentencing. The court correctly prohibited the
principle of severance when the action will ultimately change or alter the
legislative intent or primary purpose of the statute. If the Court permitted
the application of severance or excision, as proposed by the Government in
this matter, it would endow the judiciary with a power of creating laws exclusively provided to the legislative branch of government. Furthermore, if
the judiciary is provided this type of power, statutory law could be modified
by prosecutors throughout the county to successfully convict and sentence
to a desired result. Lastly, the Court must address the issue of retroactivity
created by the Miller decision.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

JudiciaryAuthority Limitations

Laws are created and amended by Congress and are interpreted by the
judiciary to enforce the congressional intent of the statute. The powers of
the branches of government are clearly defined and divided. The Government, in Under Seal, proposed to sever unconstitutional provisions of a
statute to permit a constitutional punishment of an unrelated crime. The
68. Id at 726 (citing BMW ofN. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)).
69. Id at 727; see generally Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001) ("Deprivation of the
right to fair warning . . . can result . . . from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of

statutory language that appears narrow and precise on its face . . . ").
70. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Graham, 560 U.S. at 48; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460; and
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
71. Under Seal, 819 F.3d at 721.
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Court properly denied this application because it would extend judiciary
discretion beyond its power into authority exclusively granted to the legislature. The judiciary cannot create new laws or modify them in manner that
would alter or invalidate the law of the legislature. Limiting the breadth of
severability and its overall application in Under Seal ensures prosecutors
will remain within due bounds of the judiciary power regarding statutory
interpretation.
B.

Preventingan Abuse of Government ProsecutorPower

The goal of every prosecutor in the country is to put guilty criminals in
prison. The prosecution applies statutory law to facts to ensure a judicial
conviction and subsequently sentence the violating offender to an applicable punishment. A prosecutor should not be given the ability to sever unconstitutional punishment provisions within a statutory law only to assert
punishments of an inapplicable crime within the same law. This action
would not only be a miscarriage of justice but it would create a disparate
impact on sentencing throughout the country. This type of action would
promote higher conviction rates and infringe on the legislative purpose the
statute was created to serve. The appellate court in Under Seal appropriately limited the Government's ability to sever the applicable statute in a way
that would punish a criminal juvenile offender outside of the congressional
intent.
C.

Retroactivity ofMiller

The Miller decision created a retroactivity of sentencing on collateral review that will have future implications on the decisions prior to Miller. The
appellate court in Under Seal did not completely address the implications of
the retroactivity of Miller due to its inapplicability within the facts of the
case. However, the Under Seal decision further defines the protections afforded to criminal juvenile offenders sentenced to death or mandatory life
without parole. Any criminal juvenile offenders, sentenced prior to the Miller decision, to death or life without parole will seek collateral review of
their judgment in reliance to the rationale in Under Seal. The issue of retroactive remedies for now unconstitutional sentencing of juvenile offenders,
if left in its current state, will become problematic for lower courts.
The Supreme Court must now ensure that lower courts apply the substantive rule provided in Miller when resentencing matters of retroactivity. The
decision in Miller clearly established that a juvenile cannot be sentenced to
life imprisonment without parole. The Court's holding requires consideration of defendant's age and whether the crime reflects transient immaturity
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to determine if sentencing is within the protection of the Eighth Amendment. Former juvenile offenders should have the right to have information
that was unavailable at the initial hearing brought before the court. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana must release the now 70-year-old Henry
Montgomery, who was sentenced at 17-years-old to an automatic life without parole. The Court has an opportunity to free an individual who has
served a sentence that extended beyond the promotion of retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes by juvenile offenders. States have a responsibility to effectively demonstrate the retroactive impact of Miller by reducing sentences or providing opportunities for parole. Mr. Montgomery and
individuals similarly situated are owed a debt by our United States Government: to be provided the Constitutional protection they are rightly entitled.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Under Seal decision further defines the sentencing of juvenile offenders. Under Seal establishes the parameters for the utilization of severance and excision when eliminating unconstitutional provisions of a statute.
Under Seal can be used to further support retroactive resentencing or the
inclusion of parole provisions to a life sentence. The decision represents
another case that solidifies the Constitutional protections provided to juvenile offenders from "cruel and unusual punishments" under the Eighth
Amendment.
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